Author: Drew Masada
On Monday, the Secretary – General of the United Nations (UN) Ban Ki-Moon began talks with the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities with the intention of brokering an agreement that would end the de-facto partition of the island that has existed since 1974. Cyprus has been plagued by decades of ethnic strife and failed peace deals. In 2004, UN Secretary – General Kofi Annan and the European Union (EU) led a joint effort to bring both sides to a power-sharing agreement. They believed that a combination of reasoned discourse and a desire to be part of the European Community would be sufficient. They failed on two accounts. They failed to link membership in the EU with the passage of the Annan Plan. In addition, they also failed to see that the Turkish Cypriot representative Rauf Denktash was a spoiler to the negotiations. When put to a joint referendum, the Annan Plan failed. While the Turkish Cypriot people voted in favor of the Plan, the Greek Cypriot people voted against it. The Greek Cypriots, entered into the European Union as the official representatives of the island, and both the Turkish Cypriots and the Turks were shut out of the opportunity to join the EU.
How has the situation changed since 2004? The first and most obvious difference is the new Secretary – General Ban Ki-Moon. Each new leader brings a fresh new perspective and enthusiasm for tackling this tough problem. A second difference is of even greater significance to the negotiations. In 2004, old guard politicians represented the two sides. Currently, the Turkish and Greek Cypriot people have elected new Presidents. Both are more moderate, pro- peace leaders. The Greek Cypriots elected Demetris Christofias, a bona fide Communist who pledged that resolving the conflict was a top priority of his administration. Mehmet Ali Talat, who is also a leftist, represents the Turkish Cypriots. In 2004, Talat openly called for Turkish Cypriots to support the Annan Plan. Christofias and Ali Talat began biweekly meetings in 2008. UN and other negotiators have hinted at progress, but many issues still remain.
While change in leadership is a hopeful sign, many of the problems of 2004, are unchanged. Since entering the EU, Greek Cypriots have little incentive to make concessions to the Turkish Cypriots in order to share power with them. The Turkish Cypriots are still economically disadvantaged and have not seen the reward from voting in favor of the Annan Plan. The EU, US and Turkey still wish to bring Turkey into the EU, drawing them closer to the European sphere.
The final piece of the challenge-facing Secretary – General Moon is the upcoming April 18 deadline when the Turkish Cypriot people elect their president. This puts pressure on Mehmet Ali Talat to bring the negotiations to a close before the election as he is currently trailing Dervis Eroglu in the polls. Dervis Eroglu, the current Prime Minister of the Turkish Cypriot community is a more conservative leader. Many diplomats fear that if he is elected, he will discontinue the peace talks, dashing the hopes of a settlement for years to come. This situation is similar to the defeat of Glafcos Clerides in the 2003 Greek Cypriot presidential election. Many felt that Mr. Clerides was defeated for his inability to deliver a plan that was both acceptable to his people and Mr. Denktash.
Given the current state of affairs on Cyprus, what can be done to facilitate a settlement where others have failed? One way to reach agreement when divvying up the proverbial pie of assets is to grow the pie. Increasing economic opportunities in Northern Ireland enabled both sides to perceive the future economic gains from peace. Another more direct method is simple side payments. Essentially, this means that the EU would give money/aid to both sides as incentive for continued participation in a power sharing government. Since each side seems to want more than what is already on the table – the Greek Cypriots must be compensated for departing a beneficial status quo and the Turkish Cypriots want greater economic opportunity for the loss of their political autonomy. Rhetorical and constructivist persuasion has already been tried, to disastrous effect. Both the people and politicians of Cyprus have shown remarkable capacity to weather all means of deadlines and international pressure. Leaders need real and concrete benefits to bring back to their constituents. That said there are many ways to ensure the passage and success of a power sharing peace agreement. Hopefully, the UN, EU and other third parties can find the circumstances and structure that will be successful in Cyprus.
Thursday, February 25, 2010
Election Day in Sri Lanka
Author: Lauren Wells
Today Sri Lankans will go to the polls – a full two years ahead of scheduled elections – to reaffirm their confidence in their current president or throw him out and pick a new one. President Mahinda Rajapaksa hedged his reelection prospects on his popularity from the successful defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2009. In a challenge, resulting from disputed responsibility for the war’s success, Rajapaksa’s military General Sarath Fonseka resigned in November to run against him in the election. The race has been contentious with reports of hundreds injured and at least four people killed in pre-election violence. It is an important election with the winner taking the reins at a pivotal time in the country’s history.
The Sinhalese vote appears to be very close between the two candidates. Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, a nationalist Sinhalese group, and the United National Party have come out in support of Fonseka. However, the former President of Sri Lanka (1994-2005) and ranking member of Sri Lanka’s Freedom Party Chandrika Kumaratunga voiced her support for Fonseka, rather than her own party’s candidate.
With the Sinhalese vote appearing to be split, the Tamil minority could play a significant role in deciding the victor. Neither candidate is receiving enthusiastic support. Both Rajapaksa and Fonseka are hard-line Sinhalese nationalists, with one candidate responsible for declaring war on the Tamil Tigers, the other responsible for actually waging the war. The importance of the Tamil vote is a somewhat ironic twist from recent years where tsunami aid was diverted and where Tamil civilians found themselves caught in the middle of a bloody conclusion to years of civil war that killed thousands of Tamil Tigers and civilians alike. Past transgressions will certainly be on the minds of many Tamils as they go to the polls today, if they even feel motivated to go at all.
The future of Tamils and their role in Sri Lanka is also at stake. Many are concerned about reconciliation and the future of power sharing agreement. After the war, President Rajapaksa was slow to release the hundreds of thousands of Tamils held in internment camps. Once he announced the election he began to release persons from the camps in greater numbers and loosen travel restrictions – a move probably motivated by the unexpected importance of the Tamil vote. It is unclear whether this attempt at reconciliation will move beyond today. On the other hand, Fonseka’s devotion to reconciliation is also unclear. However, some Tamil groups, including the Tamil National Alliance, have come out in support of the former general believing their future would be better suited in his hands.
Many Tamils and Tamil Diaspora will be watching and waiting for the results which are expected to be announced Wednesday. Tamils may matter right now, but once the election is passed it is unclear what role they will play in post-war Sri Lanka and whether either candidate will be committed to continued reconciliation after decades of violence.
***UPDATE***
President Rajapaksa was re-elected Tuesday by a seventeen percent margin. Shortly after the results were announced, Sri Lankan military forces surrounded the hotel where Fonseka was staying. However, Fonseka was able to leave the hotel without further confrontation. Supporters of Fonseka are charging Rajapaksa with abusing his power during the election, as well as voting irregularities. Fonseka has announced that he intends to leave the island due to death threats, but that the Sri Lankan government is baring his attempt to do so. President Rajapaksa says his government is investigating whether Fonseka gave inaccurate information to a newspaper regarding possible war crimes and whether he should be prosecuted.
As for voter turnout, the BBC is reporting that nearly seventy percent of the population turned out to vote, but only thirty percent of Tamils. The low Tamil turnout is most likely attributed to dissatisfaction, as well as displacement that prevented many from registering to vote.
Today Sri Lankans will go to the polls – a full two years ahead of scheduled elections – to reaffirm their confidence in their current president or throw him out and pick a new one. President Mahinda Rajapaksa hedged his reelection prospects on his popularity from the successful defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2009. In a challenge, resulting from disputed responsibility for the war’s success, Rajapaksa’s military General Sarath Fonseka resigned in November to run against him in the election. The race has been contentious with reports of hundreds injured and at least four people killed in pre-election violence. It is an important election with the winner taking the reins at a pivotal time in the country’s history.
The Sinhalese vote appears to be very close between the two candidates. Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, a nationalist Sinhalese group, and the United National Party have come out in support of Fonseka. However, the former President of Sri Lanka (1994-2005) and ranking member of Sri Lanka’s Freedom Party Chandrika Kumaratunga voiced her support for Fonseka, rather than her own party’s candidate.
With the Sinhalese vote appearing to be split, the Tamil minority could play a significant role in deciding the victor. Neither candidate is receiving enthusiastic support. Both Rajapaksa and Fonseka are hard-line Sinhalese nationalists, with one candidate responsible for declaring war on the Tamil Tigers, the other responsible for actually waging the war. The importance of the Tamil vote is a somewhat ironic twist from recent years where tsunami aid was diverted and where Tamil civilians found themselves caught in the middle of a bloody conclusion to years of civil war that killed thousands of Tamil Tigers and civilians alike. Past transgressions will certainly be on the minds of many Tamils as they go to the polls today, if they even feel motivated to go at all.
The future of Tamils and their role in Sri Lanka is also at stake. Many are concerned about reconciliation and the future of power sharing agreement. After the war, President Rajapaksa was slow to release the hundreds of thousands of Tamils held in internment camps. Once he announced the election he began to release persons from the camps in greater numbers and loosen travel restrictions – a move probably motivated by the unexpected importance of the Tamil vote. It is unclear whether this attempt at reconciliation will move beyond today. On the other hand, Fonseka’s devotion to reconciliation is also unclear. However, some Tamil groups, including the Tamil National Alliance, have come out in support of the former general believing their future would be better suited in his hands.
Many Tamils and Tamil Diaspora will be watching and waiting for the results which are expected to be announced Wednesday. Tamils may matter right now, but once the election is passed it is unclear what role they will play in post-war Sri Lanka and whether either candidate will be committed to continued reconciliation after decades of violence.
***UPDATE***
President Rajapaksa was re-elected Tuesday by a seventeen percent margin. Shortly after the results were announced, Sri Lankan military forces surrounded the hotel where Fonseka was staying. However, Fonseka was able to leave the hotel without further confrontation. Supporters of Fonseka are charging Rajapaksa with abusing his power during the election, as well as voting irregularities. Fonseka has announced that he intends to leave the island due to death threats, but that the Sri Lankan government is baring his attempt to do so. President Rajapaksa says his government is investigating whether Fonseka gave inaccurate information to a newspaper regarding possible war crimes and whether he should be prosecuted.
As for voter turnout, the BBC is reporting that nearly seventy percent of the population turned out to vote, but only thirty percent of Tamils. The low Tamil turnout is most likely attributed to dissatisfaction, as well as displacement that prevented many from registering to vote.
Resetting Relations with Russia?
Author: Drew Masada
While high-level game theory is not for the faint of heart, or math-impaired, many of its basic principles are useful for understanding the real world of international relations. At its essence, game theory is merely a simplified model of a two-person interaction in a strategic environment. Working from a set of explicitly held assumptions about the nature of the universe in which the strategic interaction occurs, one can find an optimal strategy that maximizes the benefit to a particular actor. There are many different ways to view the state of the universe, such as: whether actors have complete information or incomplete information; whether the interaction between actors occurs only once or if it will occur indefinitely over time; whether cooperation is rewarded or punished; and whether signals are costly or just cheap talk.
This scenario will use the basic ideas of game theory in order to map out one possible explanation of the Obama Administration’s attempts to reset relations with Russia. One possible interpretation of the United States’ recent change in position regarding the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems in eastern Europe is that it is a costly signal to Russia, indicating their willingness to accept audience costs (domestically and from their eastern European allies) in order to begin a better relationship with Russia. The scenario assumes that while the Obama Administration knows what kind of actor it is, Russia does not. In addition, it will be assumed that this is a cooperative game, in which cooperation between the United States and Russia will result in a higher payoff for both than would be gained by non-cooperation. Also, in this scenario, as in real life, the interaction is iterated, i.e., those interactions will occur continuously over an indefinite period of time. Finally, the United States’ change in policy will be labeled as a costly signal. The Obama Administration’s new stance on BMD systems in eastern Europe opened them up to attacks in the domestic arena from those who felt that we were appeasing Russia and not protecting our allies, as well as from allies in the region who lost face after making a political effort to support the plan to their own constituencies.
Imagine a scenario in which there are two possible states of nature: either the United States is humble in its foreign policy or it is not, as evidenced by the H+ and H- labels coming from the central circle that represents Nature. In each possible state of nature, the United States, in the square boxes, has two possible actions: either to send a costly signal, or engage in cheap talk, labeled S+ and S-. Now Russia does not know the true nature of the United States, but can observe the signals that the United States sends.
Click to Zoom
Russia’s response will depend upon two factors. First, is Russia’s belief as to whether the United States is humble or not. Second, is Russia’s belief as to what strategy each type of United States will pursue. For example, if Russia believes that there is a .7 likelihood that the United States is humble and a .3 likelihood that the United States is not humble, and believes that a humble United States will always make a costly signal and an arrogant United States will choose not to, Russia will be more likely to believe that they are interacting with a cooperative United States and thus reciprocate the costly signal with cooperation. However, if it is equally likely that the United States is humble or not and an arrogant United States will mix its strategies, choosing to cooperate or not in a random fashion in order to make its type indistinguishable from a humble United States, Russia has no clear best action.
Besides the fact that it is a cooperative game, where cooperation is rewarded with a higher payoff, it is an iterated game. One famous game theory experiment found that when playing over an indefinite period of time, the most successful strategy is to mirror the last move of the other player. Formally, the strategy is called Tit for Tat. Thus, as in real life, if two actors were locked into a cycle of non-cooperation, and if one actor is able change its behavior for one round and make a gesture of cooperation and it reciprocated by a cooperative action, theory suggests that the interactions would then reset to a cooperative relationship. That said if Russia were to respond to the United States’ signal by non-cooperation, such action is more likely to lock -in a non-cooperative relationship for the foreseeable future.
Theory aside, the United States and the Obama Administration in particular have shown through changes in culture, language, speeches, policies, and actions that they intend to pursue a more conciliatory, more engaged relationship with other nations. Secretary of State Clinton famously traveled to Russia with a gift of a button that was intended to represent a “resetting” of relations between the two countries after years of friction over the expansion of NATO, the war in Georgia, and the planned BMD system in Eastern Europe. While the Secretary of State’s mission was a wise use of soft power to re-engage the Russians, perhaps this latest change in policy on the BMD system in Eastern Europe is yet another attempt by the United States to show the Russians that they wish to foster better relations in the future. However, the Obama Administration’s strategy might be in error. If Russia stands to gain more from non-cooperation and does not believe that amiable relations between it and the United States have to continue in the future, then they have very little incentives to engage in cooperation. But as a whole, the number of common issues that both the United States and Russia have an interest in resolving suggests that cooperative, long-term interaction may be the best outcome for both nations.
While high-level game theory is not for the faint of heart, or math-impaired, many of its basic principles are useful for understanding the real world of international relations. At its essence, game theory is merely a simplified model of a two-person interaction in a strategic environment. Working from a set of explicitly held assumptions about the nature of the universe in which the strategic interaction occurs, one can find an optimal strategy that maximizes the benefit to a particular actor. There are many different ways to view the state of the universe, such as: whether actors have complete information or incomplete information; whether the interaction between actors occurs only once or if it will occur indefinitely over time; whether cooperation is rewarded or punished; and whether signals are costly or just cheap talk.
This scenario will use the basic ideas of game theory in order to map out one possible explanation of the Obama Administration’s attempts to reset relations with Russia. One possible interpretation of the United States’ recent change in position regarding the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems in eastern Europe is that it is a costly signal to Russia, indicating their willingness to accept audience costs (domestically and from their eastern European allies) in order to begin a better relationship with Russia. The scenario assumes that while the Obama Administration knows what kind of actor it is, Russia does not. In addition, it will be assumed that this is a cooperative game, in which cooperation between the United States and Russia will result in a higher payoff for both than would be gained by non-cooperation. Also, in this scenario, as in real life, the interaction is iterated, i.e., those interactions will occur continuously over an indefinite period of time. Finally, the United States’ change in policy will be labeled as a costly signal. The Obama Administration’s new stance on BMD systems in eastern Europe opened them up to attacks in the domestic arena from those who felt that we were appeasing Russia and not protecting our allies, as well as from allies in the region who lost face after making a political effort to support the plan to their own constituencies.
Imagine a scenario in which there are two possible states of nature: either the United States is humble in its foreign policy or it is not, as evidenced by the H+ and H- labels coming from the central circle that represents Nature. In each possible state of nature, the United States, in the square boxes, has two possible actions: either to send a costly signal, or engage in cheap talk, labeled S+ and S-. Now Russia does not know the true nature of the United States, but can observe the signals that the United States sends.
Click to Zoom
Besides the fact that it is a cooperative game, where cooperation is rewarded with a higher payoff, it is an iterated game. One famous game theory experiment found that when playing over an indefinite period of time, the most successful strategy is to mirror the last move of the other player. Formally, the strategy is called Tit for Tat. Thus, as in real life, if two actors were locked into a cycle of non-cooperation, and if one actor is able change its behavior for one round and make a gesture of cooperation and it reciprocated by a cooperative action, theory suggests that the interactions would then reset to a cooperative relationship. That said if Russia were to respond to the United States’ signal by non-cooperation, such action is more likely to lock -in a non-cooperative relationship for the foreseeable future.
Theory aside, the United States and the Obama Administration in particular have shown through changes in culture, language, speeches, policies, and actions that they intend to pursue a more conciliatory, more engaged relationship with other nations. Secretary of State Clinton famously traveled to Russia with a gift of a button that was intended to represent a “resetting” of relations between the two countries after years of friction over the expansion of NATO, the war in Georgia, and the planned BMD system in Eastern Europe. While the Secretary of State’s mission was a wise use of soft power to re-engage the Russians, perhaps this latest change in policy on the BMD system in Eastern Europe is yet another attempt by the United States to show the Russians that they wish to foster better relations in the future. However, the Obama Administration’s strategy might be in error. If Russia stands to gain more from non-cooperation and does not believe that amiable relations between it and the United States have to continue in the future, then they have very little incentives to engage in cooperation. But as a whole, the number of common issues that both the United States and Russia have an interest in resolving suggests that cooperative, long-term interaction may be the best outcome for both nations.
Separate but Equal: Analyzing the Enemy in Afghanistan
This is the third article in a three part series on Afghanistan.
Author: Lauren Wells
The United States is debating how to approach what has become the “Afghanistan problem.” Eight years after the start of its engagement in Afghanistan, it would appear that many still confuse the differences between al Qaeda and the Taliban. Many Americans use the names interchangeably to describe any violence or opposition directed toward American troops in Afghanistan. There are several similarities and distinct differences. What are they and how does that affect American strategy in the region, if at all?
Both the Taliban and al Qaeda were born out of the Soviet-Afghan War of the 1980’s. Al Qaeda originated under the direction of Osama bin Laden in the late 1980’s, most likely beginning in Pakistan. The Taliban began in the early 1990’s, coming to power in 1994. Both follow a fundamentalist Sunni ideology. In the current U.S. war in Afghanistan, both organizations have targeted U.S. troops and allies in the region. Both are motivated to defeat the current Kabul government and remove any U.S. presence from Afghanistan – and Pakistan.
However, there are two stark differences. First, the objectives of the Taliban are contained within the state, al Qaeda’s has global objectives. As seen in the bombings of the World Trade Center, the U.S.S. Cole, the London Underground, Madrid, Indonesia, and the September 11th attacks, al Qaeda goal is global jihad. Secondly, the Taliban was originally, and aims to be again, a government organization. Al Qaeda is a sub-state terrorist organization.
So how does this affect American strategy in Afghanistan? As President Obama prepares to announce his plan, many have argued for the need to focus the objective, even narrow it down. One way to do that is to more clearly define the enemy. Some, like Vice President Biden, have argued that the Taliban cannot be defeated and that America’s main goal should be to focus on al Qaeda. Supporters of this plan would argue that while the ideology of the Taliban is at odds with Western beliefs, some level of a weakened Taliban participation would be acceptable. Narrowing the focus on al Qaeda would probably also mean a shorter engagement in Afghanistan with decreased likelihood of long term commitment.
Biden and others may have a Hezbollah type scenario in mind. Hezbollah, also designated a terrorist organization by the U.S., is heavily entrenched in Lebanon’s political and social institutions, yet remains a regional actor rather than an international threat. Likewise, the Taliban has generally focused on Afghan centric issues, rather than the global jihad professed by al Qaeda. The problem with the argument that the Taliban could continue to exist as a strictly regional actor has already proven disastrous. While the Taliban was in power, from 1994 to 2001, they were a regional actor that harbored an organization with international reach. Bin Laden was allowed to move, plan, and act with impunity.
The Taliban rose to power in a period of chaos in Afghanistan. With electoral uncertainty surrounding the re-election of Hamid Karzai and factional fighting, allowing the Taliban to continue would be no guarantee that they would not regain popularity and strength in the near future, again allowing al Qaeda or similar terrorist organization to rebound as well. Unfortunately, supporters of this strategy may sacrifice a long term commitment now, for a potentially cyclical commitment in Afghanistan and the Global War on Terror over the coming years.
Others, such as General McChrystal, believe al Qaeda and the Taliban cannot be so easily separated; that ignoring the Taliban portion of the equation would result in failure. As long as popular support exists for the Taliban and the Afghan people perceive a lack of a viable alternative, there exists the chance that the Taliban will only regain power once U.S. and NATO forces withdrawal. This is probably a more accurate picture of the interactions between al Qaeda and the Taliban. It would be too simple and too narrow to believe that American strategy in Afghanistan can easily separate the Taliban from al Qaeda. It is much more complex than that.
This strategy would mean a longer commitment now in order to insure a stable, transparent government. As the recent presidential elections in Afghanistan demonstrated, this will not be an easy task quickly achieved. Unfortunately, the American public is tired of the war and support has declined significantly. Clearly defining who the antagonists are in Afghanistan, the rationale behind their deserved attention, and what must be done to succeed will go a long way in regaining the public’s support.
Author: Lauren Wells
The United States is debating how to approach what has become the “Afghanistan problem.” Eight years after the start of its engagement in Afghanistan, it would appear that many still confuse the differences between al Qaeda and the Taliban. Many Americans use the names interchangeably to describe any violence or opposition directed toward American troops in Afghanistan. There are several similarities and distinct differences. What are they and how does that affect American strategy in the region, if at all?
Both the Taliban and al Qaeda were born out of the Soviet-Afghan War of the 1980’s. Al Qaeda originated under the direction of Osama bin Laden in the late 1980’s, most likely beginning in Pakistan. The Taliban began in the early 1990’s, coming to power in 1994. Both follow a fundamentalist Sunni ideology. In the current U.S. war in Afghanistan, both organizations have targeted U.S. troops and allies in the region. Both are motivated to defeat the current Kabul government and remove any U.S. presence from Afghanistan – and Pakistan.
However, there are two stark differences. First, the objectives of the Taliban are contained within the state, al Qaeda’s has global objectives. As seen in the bombings of the World Trade Center, the U.S.S. Cole, the London Underground, Madrid, Indonesia, and the September 11th attacks, al Qaeda goal is global jihad. Secondly, the Taliban was originally, and aims to be again, a government organization. Al Qaeda is a sub-state terrorist organization.
So how does this affect American strategy in Afghanistan? As President Obama prepares to announce his plan, many have argued for the need to focus the objective, even narrow it down. One way to do that is to more clearly define the enemy. Some, like Vice President Biden, have argued that the Taliban cannot be defeated and that America’s main goal should be to focus on al Qaeda. Supporters of this plan would argue that while the ideology of the Taliban is at odds with Western beliefs, some level of a weakened Taliban participation would be acceptable. Narrowing the focus on al Qaeda would probably also mean a shorter engagement in Afghanistan with decreased likelihood of long term commitment.
Biden and others may have a Hezbollah type scenario in mind. Hezbollah, also designated a terrorist organization by the U.S., is heavily entrenched in Lebanon’s political and social institutions, yet remains a regional actor rather than an international threat. Likewise, the Taliban has generally focused on Afghan centric issues, rather than the global jihad professed by al Qaeda. The problem with the argument that the Taliban could continue to exist as a strictly regional actor has already proven disastrous. While the Taliban was in power, from 1994 to 2001, they were a regional actor that harbored an organization with international reach. Bin Laden was allowed to move, plan, and act with impunity.
The Taliban rose to power in a period of chaos in Afghanistan. With electoral uncertainty surrounding the re-election of Hamid Karzai and factional fighting, allowing the Taliban to continue would be no guarantee that they would not regain popularity and strength in the near future, again allowing al Qaeda or similar terrorist organization to rebound as well. Unfortunately, supporters of this strategy may sacrifice a long term commitment now, for a potentially cyclical commitment in Afghanistan and the Global War on Terror over the coming years.
Others, such as General McChrystal, believe al Qaeda and the Taliban cannot be so easily separated; that ignoring the Taliban portion of the equation would result in failure. As long as popular support exists for the Taliban and the Afghan people perceive a lack of a viable alternative, there exists the chance that the Taliban will only regain power once U.S. and NATO forces withdrawal. This is probably a more accurate picture of the interactions between al Qaeda and the Taliban. It would be too simple and too narrow to believe that American strategy in Afghanistan can easily separate the Taliban from al Qaeda. It is much more complex than that.
This strategy would mean a longer commitment now in order to insure a stable, transparent government. As the recent presidential elections in Afghanistan demonstrated, this will not be an easy task quickly achieved. Unfortunately, the American public is tired of the war and support has declined significantly. Clearly defining who the antagonists are in Afghanistan, the rationale behind their deserved attention, and what must be done to succeed will go a long way in regaining the public’s support.
Comparing Taliban and Al-Shabaab
This is the second article in a three part series on Afghanistan.
Author: Amanda TowlerComparing the Taliban in Afghanistan and Al-Shabaab Militia in Somalia
There are striking similarities between the rise of the Al-Shabaab militia in Somalia since 2006, and the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan between 1994 and 2001. Most significantly, both hard-line Islamist groups about in an atmosphere of chaos, nonexistent central government, tribal and factional fighting, general poverty and disarray. Both groups sought to fill a power void with their extremist interpretations of Islamic shari’a law and combat the feable and corrupt Western-supported governments. This article will compare how the Taliban and Al-Shabaab interpret and enforce Islamic law, in hopes of providing some insight into whether the recent history of the Taliban holds any lessons for understanding Al-Shabaab. Will Islamic extreamism eventually erode the support of Al-Shabaab in Somalia as it did the Taliban toward the end of its rule in Afghanistan? How might this affect the Somali government’s counterstrategy decisions?
The table below provides a brief look at the similarities between the Taliban’s and Al-Shabaab’s enforcement of shari’a law in the territories they control(led).
Click to Zoom
One common thread between the rule of the two groups is the strict and swift punishments given out to petty thieves and adulters, ranging from instant beatings to public amputations and executions. This may be one reason why each group initially enjoyed considerable popularity, as people may have welcomed swift justice as an alternative to no justice at all. Another commonality is the banning of sources of Western influence, including television and cinema by the Taliban, and pop-song cell phone ringers by Al-Shabaab. This likely resonated with the more conservative religious people who already resented Western influence in their society in their government. Still another similarity, not reflected in the table, is how both groups have colluded with Al Qaeda to varying degrees and on pragmatic terms. Al-Shabaab has declared its allegiance to Al Qaeda, but there is little evidence that Al Qaeda provides tactical or strategic leadership to the group. Perhaps the most significant difference between the two groups, however, is the Taliban’s far more extreme restrictions on women; thus far Al-Shabaab has not enacted the same level of oppression as did the Taliban. This may be because Al-Shabaab is currently devoting most of its capacity to active combat and it does not have the time or manpower to enforce such broad changes in behavior. It may also reflect pragmatism on the part of Al-Shabaab—they may be muffling their extreme message in response to some protests and loss of popular support. Some Somali women have voiced their concern about what life would be like under Al-Shabaab control, while others feel that Al-Shabaab’s enforcement of shari’a has been good for society. Al-Shabaab’s actions suggest that it would severely restrict many aspects of women’s lives if it won control over the country.
Comparing the Taliban and Al-Shabaab allows us to compare the effectiveness of counterstrategies that the respective central governments and their allies have used to combat these militant groups. In Afghanistan, a primary counterstrategy was to exploit the rifts in the Taliban and to target members whose commitment to the Taliban was wavering. Al-Shabaab also suffers from internal rifts, suggesting that a similar strategy, which the Somali transitional government is now employing, may eventually prove effective. The current U.S. and NATO strategy in Afghanistan places heavy emphasis on rooting out endemic corruption in local and national government and equipping it with the means to provide basic services and infrastructure. In Somalia, similar measures could go a long way toward winning back the support of many moderate Somalis who are not intellectually aligned with Al-Shabaab but appreciate the marginal stability and security the group provides. This is perhaps the most important lesson that the experience of Afghanistan can offer to Somalia, that the ideologically extreme militant group only enjoys support as a last resort, when the secular state has failed to offer a better alternative.
General McChrystal’s COIN
This is the first in a three-part series on Afghanistan.
Author: Drew Masada
As President Obama contemplates his options for the war in Afghanistan, he faces a number of tough choices. Near the top of those choices is whether to grant General McChrystal’s request to begin a counter-insurgency (COIN) operation in Afghanistan, as outlined in his Initial Assessment, released on August 30, 2009. Putting aside the political and civil-military considerations, the President’s decision will depend on four issues: 1.) whether he believes the current U.S. COIN doctrine is correct and effective; 2.) whether or not he wishes to use it; 3.) whether he believes that General McChrystal’s request represents a proper application of COIN doctrine; and 4.) whether or not he will grant the request in full.
While it may be difficult to assess President Obama’s beliefs on these issues, it is possible to make an objective assessment as to whether General McChrystal’s assessment is in line with the requirements of COIN doctrine.
The most current U.S. Armed Forces doctrine on counter-insurgency has been shaped by their experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and by a number of select Army scholars. Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl (Retired) is arguably one of the most influential scholars on this issue. Currently President of the Center for New American Security, he received his M.Phil. and D.Phil. from Oxford University and taught at the United States Military Academy. In addition to serving in Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom, he helped to author the Army’s counter-insurgency field manual. In the previous administration, he served as a military assistant to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and was an advisor to General Petraeus. Despite his close involvement to members of the previous administration, he remains an influential expert in COIN doctrine. His doctoral thesis was a comparison of the organizational cultures of the British and American armies and how their respective learning cultures impacted their successes and failures in combating insurgencies. Within these case studies, he outlines the elements of successful COIN doctrine and how to create the optimal learning environment (Nagl, 2005).
After comparing these elements to General McChrystal’s requests, it is clear that General McChrystal’s assessment follows COIN doctrine in four main areas: increasing troop levels for population-centric COIN, creating a unity of command, the use of minimum necessary force appropriate to the threat, and allowing for the development of local doctrine (Nagl, 2005).
To conduct population-centric COIN, one needs a sufficient number of troops. One must have a physical presence in every population center to protect citizens from insurgent attacks and prevent insurgents from establishing a base of support. General McChrystal calls for a range of additional troops to conduct COIN operations, and to compensate for years of being under-resourced (McChrystal, 7). McChrystal also calls for a “Unity of Command” where different units are placed under one command and channeled as one to fulfill political objectives. McChrystal specifically outlines his plan for an Integrated Civil Military Campaign Plan (ICMCP) (McChrystal, 39). This would enable commanders at all levels to use the minimum force appropriate to address a threat, with the goal of protecting the civilian population over capturing and killing insurgents. Finally, McChrystal echoes Lt. Col. Nagl’s findings on the need for local responses to local conditions. Nagl found that the armies that had the most successful learning environments were those in which commanders, at the local level, had the leeway to adapt practices and doctrine to better fit the conditions in which they found themselves. In fact, General McChrystal’s assessment gives discretion to commanders on how best to use development funds, calling for them to “err on the side of initiative.” (McChrystal, 21). Overall, McChrystal’s assessment that calls for a new direction in the war in Afghanistan follows many of the major precepts of current COIN doctrine.
While these steps will allow the U.S. and NATO forces to make progress toward shifting the momentum away from the Taliban insurgency, there are still a number of impediments to a fully successful strategy in Afghanistan.
To begin with, effective COIN operations require that the occupying force must have an effective and robust partner in the local government forces. They must be able to conduct joint operations to secure and protect the local population. Successful operations will build trust in the indigenous military forces. Local government forces must also be strong enough so that once the insurgency is defeated or sufficiently weakened, the occupying military may depart, handing off control to the local government forces. Unfortunately, despite the best efforts of the U.S. and our NATO allies, the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) are undermanned, underdeveloped, underpaid, and, in some cases, unreliable. General McChrystal has set a target to increase the Afghan National Army (ANA) from 93,980 to 134,000 men in the next year (McChrystal, 23). The most recent report from the office of the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction reported that approximately half of all Afghan men are illiterate, creating difficulties in training, a paucity of professional and well-trained commanding officers, and problems with retention. Between May and September of 2009, the number of units in the Afghan Army capable of operating independently decreased from forty-seven to forty-four (SIGAR, 71). While McChrystal acknowledged the need to build up, give better resources to, and better integrate the ANSF, this is an area that will require considerable improvement for the COIN doctrine to succeed in Afghanistan.
Another unfortunate reality of the situation in Afghanistan is the endemic and widespread corruption within the Islamic Government of Afghanistan (IGoA). Some economic historians have postulated that governance began when the so-called “roving bandit” became aware that he or she could extract more from the population by providing them protection in exchange for taking a percentage of their labors than simple extraction alone. Thus, the greater the protection a ruler could provide, the more likely the people were to invest in crops and industries that were higher risk for a higher reward. In Afghanistan, our military assistance and foreign aid have had the unintended effect of short-circuiting that exchange when we attempt to provide security and give funds without demanding accountability to central government leaders. And while in many wars, violence and corruption are a means to gain political power and influence, in other wars, they become an end in itself. Political scientist Jean Reno has found many examples in which rival warlords perpetuate a conflict solely for material gain. The situation could be similar for some Afghani politicians and leaders. McChrystal makes it a point to acknowledge and then call for corruption reform. He understands that one of the major means of winning over the populace is to ensure they enjoy a government that is accountable. It remains to be seen how McChrystal will overcome the challenge of convincing the Afghani people after the disputed national elections. COIN doctrine suggests that building responsible and accountable leadership from the bottom up is most effective. The New York Times recently ran a story of a village in Afghanistan, Jurm, which is doing exactly that (Tavernise, 2009).
Finally, General McChrystal’s plan must fully address how they plan to deny the Taliban the territory on which to have a home base and the capacity to reap the profits from poppy cultivation. When the Colombian government allowed the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a leftist insurgent group, to operate in its own sovereign territory, the FARC built a pseudo-state where they controlled much of the operations, which enabled them to profit from the cultivation of Coca in the cocaine drug trade. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that in 2008, insurgent elements in Afghanistan collected up to half a billion dollars from taxing the cultivation, production, and trafficking of heroin (UNODC, 6). Although the market has dropped in comparison to the previous year, UNODC analysts suspect that insurgents are holding a supply of opium in reserve in order to affect future prices and to ensure the continued source of financing for their operations (UNODC, 7). If the Taliban cannot be separated from their base of operations in the South and from their second biggest source of financing, they will continue to threaten the stability of the IGoA.
In short, if resourced fully and implemented properly, General McChrystal’s call for a new direction in the Afghan war through COIN is likely to produce results. That said, the success of the COIN operations will hinge upon whether or not the U.S., NATO, and IGoA can address the problems of the ANSF, corruption, and trafficking.
For more information:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/20/AR2009092002920.html
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/world/asia/13jurm.html
http://www.sigar.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Oct09/pdf/SIGAROct2009Web.pdf
http://www.unodc.org/…/afghanistan//Afghanistan_Opium_Survey_2008.pdf
Author: Drew Masada
As President Obama contemplates his options for the war in Afghanistan, he faces a number of tough choices. Near the top of those choices is whether to grant General McChrystal’s request to begin a counter-insurgency (COIN) operation in Afghanistan, as outlined in his Initial Assessment, released on August 30, 2009. Putting aside the political and civil-military considerations, the President’s decision will depend on four issues: 1.) whether he believes the current U.S. COIN doctrine is correct and effective; 2.) whether or not he wishes to use it; 3.) whether he believes that General McChrystal’s request represents a proper application of COIN doctrine; and 4.) whether or not he will grant the request in full.
While it may be difficult to assess President Obama’s beliefs on these issues, it is possible to make an objective assessment as to whether General McChrystal’s assessment is in line with the requirements of COIN doctrine.
The most current U.S. Armed Forces doctrine on counter-insurgency has been shaped by their experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and by a number of select Army scholars. Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl (Retired) is arguably one of the most influential scholars on this issue. Currently President of the Center for New American Security, he received his M.Phil. and D.Phil. from Oxford University and taught at the United States Military Academy. In addition to serving in Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom, he helped to author the Army’s counter-insurgency field manual. In the previous administration, he served as a military assistant to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and was an advisor to General Petraeus. Despite his close involvement to members of the previous administration, he remains an influential expert in COIN doctrine. His doctoral thesis was a comparison of the organizational cultures of the British and American armies and how their respective learning cultures impacted their successes and failures in combating insurgencies. Within these case studies, he outlines the elements of successful COIN doctrine and how to create the optimal learning environment (Nagl, 2005).
After comparing these elements to General McChrystal’s requests, it is clear that General McChrystal’s assessment follows COIN doctrine in four main areas: increasing troop levels for population-centric COIN, creating a unity of command, the use of minimum necessary force appropriate to the threat, and allowing for the development of local doctrine (Nagl, 2005).
To conduct population-centric COIN, one needs a sufficient number of troops. One must have a physical presence in every population center to protect citizens from insurgent attacks and prevent insurgents from establishing a base of support. General McChrystal calls for a range of additional troops to conduct COIN operations, and to compensate for years of being under-resourced (McChrystal, 7). McChrystal also calls for a “Unity of Command” where different units are placed under one command and channeled as one to fulfill political objectives. McChrystal specifically outlines his plan for an Integrated Civil Military Campaign Plan (ICMCP) (McChrystal, 39). This would enable commanders at all levels to use the minimum force appropriate to address a threat, with the goal of protecting the civilian population over capturing and killing insurgents. Finally, McChrystal echoes Lt. Col. Nagl’s findings on the need for local responses to local conditions. Nagl found that the armies that had the most successful learning environments were those in which commanders, at the local level, had the leeway to adapt practices and doctrine to better fit the conditions in which they found themselves. In fact, General McChrystal’s assessment gives discretion to commanders on how best to use development funds, calling for them to “err on the side of initiative.” (McChrystal, 21). Overall, McChrystal’s assessment that calls for a new direction in the war in Afghanistan follows many of the major precepts of current COIN doctrine.
While these steps will allow the U.S. and NATO forces to make progress toward shifting the momentum away from the Taliban insurgency, there are still a number of impediments to a fully successful strategy in Afghanistan.
To begin with, effective COIN operations require that the occupying force must have an effective and robust partner in the local government forces. They must be able to conduct joint operations to secure and protect the local population. Successful operations will build trust in the indigenous military forces. Local government forces must also be strong enough so that once the insurgency is defeated or sufficiently weakened, the occupying military may depart, handing off control to the local government forces. Unfortunately, despite the best efforts of the U.S. and our NATO allies, the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) are undermanned, underdeveloped, underpaid, and, in some cases, unreliable. General McChrystal has set a target to increase the Afghan National Army (ANA) from 93,980 to 134,000 men in the next year (McChrystal, 23). The most recent report from the office of the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction reported that approximately half of all Afghan men are illiterate, creating difficulties in training, a paucity of professional and well-trained commanding officers, and problems with retention. Between May and September of 2009, the number of units in the Afghan Army capable of operating independently decreased from forty-seven to forty-four (SIGAR, 71). While McChrystal acknowledged the need to build up, give better resources to, and better integrate the ANSF, this is an area that will require considerable improvement for the COIN doctrine to succeed in Afghanistan.
Another unfortunate reality of the situation in Afghanistan is the endemic and widespread corruption within the Islamic Government of Afghanistan (IGoA). Some economic historians have postulated that governance began when the so-called “roving bandit” became aware that he or she could extract more from the population by providing them protection in exchange for taking a percentage of their labors than simple extraction alone. Thus, the greater the protection a ruler could provide, the more likely the people were to invest in crops and industries that were higher risk for a higher reward. In Afghanistan, our military assistance and foreign aid have had the unintended effect of short-circuiting that exchange when we attempt to provide security and give funds without demanding accountability to central government leaders. And while in many wars, violence and corruption are a means to gain political power and influence, in other wars, they become an end in itself. Political scientist Jean Reno has found many examples in which rival warlords perpetuate a conflict solely for material gain. The situation could be similar for some Afghani politicians and leaders. McChrystal makes it a point to acknowledge and then call for corruption reform. He understands that one of the major means of winning over the populace is to ensure they enjoy a government that is accountable. It remains to be seen how McChrystal will overcome the challenge of convincing the Afghani people after the disputed national elections. COIN doctrine suggests that building responsible and accountable leadership from the bottom up is most effective. The New York Times recently ran a story of a village in Afghanistan, Jurm, which is doing exactly that (Tavernise, 2009).
Finally, General McChrystal’s plan must fully address how they plan to deny the Taliban the territory on which to have a home base and the capacity to reap the profits from poppy cultivation. When the Colombian government allowed the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a leftist insurgent group, to operate in its own sovereign territory, the FARC built a pseudo-state where they controlled much of the operations, which enabled them to profit from the cultivation of Coca in the cocaine drug trade. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that in 2008, insurgent elements in Afghanistan collected up to half a billion dollars from taxing the cultivation, production, and trafficking of heroin (UNODC, 6). Although the market has dropped in comparison to the previous year, UNODC analysts suspect that insurgents are holding a supply of opium in reserve in order to affect future prices and to ensure the continued source of financing for their operations (UNODC, 7). If the Taliban cannot be separated from their base of operations in the South and from their second biggest source of financing, they will continue to threaten the stability of the IGoA.
In short, if resourced fully and implemented properly, General McChrystal’s call for a new direction in the Afghan war through COIN is likely to produce results. That said, the success of the COIN operations will hinge upon whether or not the U.S., NATO, and IGoA can address the problems of the ANSF, corruption, and trafficking.
For more information:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/20/AR2009092002920.html
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/world/asia/13jurm.html
http://www.sigar.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Oct09/pdf/SIGAROct2009Web.pdf
http://www.unodc.org/…/afghanistan//Afghanistan_Opium_Survey_2008.pdf
A World Without Nukes?
Author: Drew Masada
I recently participated in the 62nd Annual United Nations Department of Public Information/Non-Governmental Organizations Conference on disarmament in Mexico City. I spoke on a panel that grappled with the question of how technology such as missile defense systems could help create trust in order to facilitate the conditions for nuclear disarmament.
On April 5, 2009, President Barack Obama spoke before a crowd in Hradcany Square in Prague. He said,
To maintain a stable equilibrium in this scenario, we made two main assumptions. First, non-nuclear states would lack incentives to develop the technology to produce nuclear weapons. Otherwise, nuclear-capable states would seek to escape a disarmament regime. Second, we assumed that any non-nuclear states that developed and used nuclear weapons would be uniformly punished. Non-nuclear states must not gain from defecting from a disarmament regime.
Running with these two assumptions, we used various international relations theories as lenses in order to derive what conditions would be necessary to maintain a stable equilibrium in a disarmament regime. For example, proponents of Constructivism believe that the reality that motivates state action is socially constructed by interactions between states and related actors. This lens implies that there must be mutual agreement upon the goal of nuclear disarmament. Such uniform agreement would require high levels of trust between the current nuclear capable powers, trust in the effectiveness of the missile defense system, and trust in the verification regime. Currently, there is little agreement upon the goal. This begs the question: what is the principle that underpins the current nuclear regime? While some argue that there is a norm against the use of nuclear weapons, the continuation of nuclear proliferation suggests that the need for a robust deterrence still exists.
Realists, on the other hand, believe that the international relations system is composed of states seeking security in a zero-sum anarchical world where material capabilities determine actions. This lens suggests that in order to maintain equilibrium, there must be no gain to developing nuclear weapons. Therefore, in the absence of a robust and universal agreement on the goal of a nuclear disarmament regime, equilibrium would require a robust and automatic enforcement mechanism. The enforcement mechanism would punish those who either defected from or refused to participate in the disarmament regime. It would require a reliable and trusted verification system and an automaticity of punishment. But punishment is problematic. What kind of cost could the international system impose upon an attack thwarted by effective ballistic missile defense? Too weak of a response would threaten the effectiveness of the deterrence. Too strong, and the international community would have to develop the capacity and consensus for regime change.
The third and equally challenging requirement comes from neoliberalism. Neoliberalism focuses upon the role of institutions and how organizations can help to reduce the potential costs of state interaction where each may benefit from absolute gains. Neoliberalism might call for an institution different from any that currently exist. Such an institution must be built from a foundation of greater trust, common agreement upon the need for nuclear disarmament, and possess a robust enforcement mechanism. Currently, no one organization possesses sufficient capacity, legitimacy, and power. Moreover, the details of how this organization might operate are challenging. How much sovereignty would have to be relinquished? Would it be created from the top down or bottom up? How would it be formed? Who would control it? Where would it obtain funding? One might look to the history of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as a telling example of the kind of challenges a disarmament regime might face.
Finally, taking a cue from realists who focus upon material capabilities, and from Dean Wilkening, a noted expert in the field of missile defense, one way to structure a ballistic missile defense system is at the least common denominator of protection. The system would be sufficient, for example, to protect against an accidental launch from Russia or China, or an intentional launch from a rogue regime, but not so robust as to threaten the retaliatory capabilities of any nuclear capable power with less robust missile capabilities, such as China. In short, using international relations theories as lenses to derive some of the necessary components of a stable disarmament regime, we determined that it would require: a new organization, underpinned by significant trust between nations; common agreement upon the goal of disarmament; a robust verification and enforcement mechanism; and a missile defense system that provides a lowest common denominator of protection.
But even if the disarmament regime worked exactly as intended, it presents a number of challenges that should be addressed. The first problem with an effective missile defense system is that it pushes regimes and rogue actors to pursue unconventional attacks such as suitcase nukes and dirty bombs. Since such weapons require less funding and infrastructure, they are harder to trace. From a cost-benefit perspective, it then becomes harder to justify spending large sums of money upon costly missile defense systems given the likelihood of their use. In addition, these disarmament regimes, as well as many policymakers in nuclear-capable countries, possess a narrow view of rationality. One must consider the possibility that a leader might be willing to risk his people, military, or hold on power in the hopes that enforcement will fail or due to a set of priorities different from the norm.
These challenges suggest that for some states, deterrence will be insufficient to prevent attacks upon nuclear-capable powers. Thus, other methods will have to be added to the disarmament regime in order to make it more fully effective. Overall, this is only a thumbnail sketch of what might be necessary to create an effective and long-term nuclear disarmament regime and the challenges involved in getting there.
The Obama administration seems to be making a good faith attempt to move toward this goal. The first was seen in the shift in policy on the planned European missile defense system. While there are many theories as to the actual reasoning for the change, it is a costly signal for the administration. Another costly signal will be the upcoming fight in the Senate to ratify the CTBTO treaty. In addition, for the U.S. to continue to press for a shared missile defense system with Russia suggests a willingness to trust a former Cold War enemy by the sharing the risk of national defense. The two have been taking steps towards lowering their arms levels for many years, but have not approached a level that would threaten their capacity for deterrence. Thus, while the present situation is worthy of hope, the future is still far, far away.
I recently participated in the 62nd Annual United Nations Department of Public Information/Non-Governmental Organizations Conference on disarmament in Mexico City. I spoke on a panel that grappled with the question of how technology such as missile defense systems could help create trust in order to facilitate the conditions for nuclear disarmament.
On April 5, 2009, President Barack Obama spoke before a crowd in Hradcany Square in Prague. He said,
“I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. I’m not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly—perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence. But now we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change.”During the panel, many in the audience were skeptical, and rightly so. But rather than succumbing to the paralysis of accepting the shortcomings of the current international system, we chose to begin with a state of nuclear disarmament in order to find the conditions under which such an outcome might occur.
To maintain a stable equilibrium in this scenario, we made two main assumptions. First, non-nuclear states would lack incentives to develop the technology to produce nuclear weapons. Otherwise, nuclear-capable states would seek to escape a disarmament regime. Second, we assumed that any non-nuclear states that developed and used nuclear weapons would be uniformly punished. Non-nuclear states must not gain from defecting from a disarmament regime.
Running with these two assumptions, we used various international relations theories as lenses in order to derive what conditions would be necessary to maintain a stable equilibrium in a disarmament regime. For example, proponents of Constructivism believe that the reality that motivates state action is socially constructed by interactions between states and related actors. This lens implies that there must be mutual agreement upon the goal of nuclear disarmament. Such uniform agreement would require high levels of trust between the current nuclear capable powers, trust in the effectiveness of the missile defense system, and trust in the verification regime. Currently, there is little agreement upon the goal. This begs the question: what is the principle that underpins the current nuclear regime? While some argue that there is a norm against the use of nuclear weapons, the continuation of nuclear proliferation suggests that the need for a robust deterrence still exists.
Realists, on the other hand, believe that the international relations system is composed of states seeking security in a zero-sum anarchical world where material capabilities determine actions. This lens suggests that in order to maintain equilibrium, there must be no gain to developing nuclear weapons. Therefore, in the absence of a robust and universal agreement on the goal of a nuclear disarmament regime, equilibrium would require a robust and automatic enforcement mechanism. The enforcement mechanism would punish those who either defected from or refused to participate in the disarmament regime. It would require a reliable and trusted verification system and an automaticity of punishment. But punishment is problematic. What kind of cost could the international system impose upon an attack thwarted by effective ballistic missile defense? Too weak of a response would threaten the effectiveness of the deterrence. Too strong, and the international community would have to develop the capacity and consensus for regime change.
The third and equally challenging requirement comes from neoliberalism. Neoliberalism focuses upon the role of institutions and how organizations can help to reduce the potential costs of state interaction where each may benefit from absolute gains. Neoliberalism might call for an institution different from any that currently exist. Such an institution must be built from a foundation of greater trust, common agreement upon the need for nuclear disarmament, and possess a robust enforcement mechanism. Currently, no one organization possesses sufficient capacity, legitimacy, and power. Moreover, the details of how this organization might operate are challenging. How much sovereignty would have to be relinquished? Would it be created from the top down or bottom up? How would it be formed? Who would control it? Where would it obtain funding? One might look to the history of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as a telling example of the kind of challenges a disarmament regime might face.
Finally, taking a cue from realists who focus upon material capabilities, and from Dean Wilkening, a noted expert in the field of missile defense, one way to structure a ballistic missile defense system is at the least common denominator of protection. The system would be sufficient, for example, to protect against an accidental launch from Russia or China, or an intentional launch from a rogue regime, but not so robust as to threaten the retaliatory capabilities of any nuclear capable power with less robust missile capabilities, such as China. In short, using international relations theories as lenses to derive some of the necessary components of a stable disarmament regime, we determined that it would require: a new organization, underpinned by significant trust between nations; common agreement upon the goal of disarmament; a robust verification and enforcement mechanism; and a missile defense system that provides a lowest common denominator of protection.
But even if the disarmament regime worked exactly as intended, it presents a number of challenges that should be addressed. The first problem with an effective missile defense system is that it pushes regimes and rogue actors to pursue unconventional attacks such as suitcase nukes and dirty bombs. Since such weapons require less funding and infrastructure, they are harder to trace. From a cost-benefit perspective, it then becomes harder to justify spending large sums of money upon costly missile defense systems given the likelihood of their use. In addition, these disarmament regimes, as well as many policymakers in nuclear-capable countries, possess a narrow view of rationality. One must consider the possibility that a leader might be willing to risk his people, military, or hold on power in the hopes that enforcement will fail or due to a set of priorities different from the norm.
These challenges suggest that for some states, deterrence will be insufficient to prevent attacks upon nuclear-capable powers. Thus, other methods will have to be added to the disarmament regime in order to make it more fully effective. Overall, this is only a thumbnail sketch of what might be necessary to create an effective and long-term nuclear disarmament regime and the challenges involved in getting there.
The Obama administration seems to be making a good faith attempt to move toward this goal. The first was seen in the shift in policy on the planned European missile defense system. While there are many theories as to the actual reasoning for the change, it is a costly signal for the administration. Another costly signal will be the upcoming fight in the Senate to ratify the CTBTO treaty. In addition, for the U.S. to continue to press for a shared missile defense system with Russia suggests a willingness to trust a former Cold War enemy by the sharing the risk of national defense. The two have been taking steps towards lowering their arms levels for many years, but have not approached a level that would threaten their capacity for deterrence. Thus, while the present situation is worthy of hope, the future is still far, far away.
Saturday, February 20, 2010
South Korea: Brief Overview of Geopolitical Challenges and Opportunities
Author: Amanda Towler
South Korea is economically successful, politically stable, and internationally integrated. It is also burdened by the poor, politically isolated, totalitarian, and nuclear-armed North Korea, with whom it is technically still at war. The South Koreans’ disquiet over the North is evidenced in part by the fact that Yonhap News Agency, South Korea’s largest news agency, dedicates an entire section of its Website to their enigmatic and belligerent neighbor. The relationship between the two countries is a strange affair indeed. When North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-il isn’t appealing for food aid from the South, he’s threatening to attack them, test-firing missiles and clamoring for international respect. The incongruence seems lost on Mr. Kim. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, when he came to office in February 2008, opposed the “sunshine” rapprochement policy toward the North. He unilaterally ended the unconditional aid that the South had been providing the North under the previous administration. More recently, however, he has begun cautiously engaging Mr. Kim and playing his game of cat and mouse. He has slowly begun resuming aid to the North while denouncing Mr. Kim’s threats, presumably because he believes that the alternative is potentially much worse.
The two leaders recently met secretly in Singapore, at Mr. Kim’s behest, to discuss a potential North-South summit. Mr. Kim, under pressure from international sanctions and a looming food shortage, has also hinted that he might return to the six-party talks, from which he unilaterally withdrew in April of this year. Mr. Lee is offering a “grand bargain” proposal, wherein the North would denuclearize all at once in exchange for a massive incentives package. China, Japan and the US have signaled support for the proposal, but many analysts consider it dead on arrival. The impending succession of Mr. Kim’s son, Kim Jong-un, is not expected to change this; his ascendency is more symbolic than substantive. It is more likely, however, that the “grand bargain” is intended to start the negotiations with the highest stakes possible, in hopes that even a scaled-back agreement would still yield some progress. Some analysts have suggested that if a summit is held, even if it is fruitless, Mr. Lee will enjoy the perception that his talks-for-denuclearization approach is working; at the very least, he will enjoy domestic support for making the effort. Mr. Lee does, however, risk looking weak should Mr. Kim commandeer the summit and walk all over him.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates reiterated during his visit to Seoul that the US is committed to South Korea’s security and pledged to keep it under their “nuclear umbrella,” ostensibly in response to Mr. Kim’s missile tests. China’s stance with Mr. Kim is also crucial to any negotiations because they are North Korea’s last lifeline. Although China expressed outright disapproval of recent missile tests, Premier Wen Jiabao gave public support to Mr. Kim when he visited Pyongyang. China enjoys a strategic “gatekeeper” role with North Korea, like Russia with Iran, which it is unlikely to relinquish any time soon. Most analysts expect little from the supposed North-South summit, but it could, if Mr. Kim is particularly desperate, turn out to be a strategic opportunity for the Koreas to make tangible and long overdue progress toward cross-border economic and social cooperation, such as increased tourism and family reunifications. The mere prospect of talks has garnered public support of Koreans on both sides of the border and sparked feelings of a fraternal bond. It is quite possible, though, that Mr. Kim is just giving his usual runaround, using the proposed summit as a test to make sure the US is still paying attention.
North Korea aside, South Korea seems keen to extend its economic and geopolitical reach. Mr. Lee recently signed free trade agreements with the EU and the US and is pursuing stronger ties with China, Japan, and neighboring ASEAN members. South Korea has also shown interest in several pan-Asian regimes currently being floated, focusing on such issues as security, trade and even human rights. Mr. Lee and Japan’s Prime Minister Hatoyama have also discussed improving the relationship between their countries, which was strained by Japan’s previous occupation of South Korea. This would be a welcome relief to Koreans who were forcefully relocated to Japan during the occupation and live there still.
Domestically, however, Mr. Lee’s government is facing significant political challenges that could impair the country’s economic recovery and international leadership ambitions. The death of former President Roh Moo-hyun, a progressive, revived his supporters and bolstered their challenge to the conservative President Lee, who is already facing low approval ratings. In response, Mr. Lee undertook several reform efforts to reunify the nation and calm political tensions. He reshuffled his cabinet and set up a presidential advisory committee on social integration, which briefly boosted his approval rating, suggesting that his efforts may be resonating with the general population.
Mr. Lee, in his UN General Assembly debut, emphasized South Korea’s desire to become a world leader on climate change, urged international action on water shortages and bid to host a UN agency on water issues. Mr. Lee sees a natural leadership role for South Korea in the G-20 as well, which has the third largest economy in Asia and 15th largest in the world. As a testament to this, the G-20 will officially be institutionalized in Seoul next year. Moreover, if the G-20 surpasses the G-8 in global importance, as some analysts predict, then South Korea stands to gain significant influence through the institution. South Korea’s aspirations could potentially cause tension with China and Japan, however, as they also pursue regional leadership roles and geopolitical influence.
South Korea is economically successful, politically stable, and internationally integrated. It is also burdened by the poor, politically isolated, totalitarian, and nuclear-armed North Korea, with whom it is technically still at war. The South Koreans’ disquiet over the North is evidenced in part by the fact that Yonhap News Agency, South Korea’s largest news agency, dedicates an entire section of its Website to their enigmatic and belligerent neighbor. The relationship between the two countries is a strange affair indeed. When North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-il isn’t appealing for food aid from the South, he’s threatening to attack them, test-firing missiles and clamoring for international respect. The incongruence seems lost on Mr. Kim. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, when he came to office in February 2008, opposed the “sunshine” rapprochement policy toward the North. He unilaterally ended the unconditional aid that the South had been providing the North under the previous administration. More recently, however, he has begun cautiously engaging Mr. Kim and playing his game of cat and mouse. He has slowly begun resuming aid to the North while denouncing Mr. Kim’s threats, presumably because he believes that the alternative is potentially much worse.
The two leaders recently met secretly in Singapore, at Mr. Kim’s behest, to discuss a potential North-South summit. Mr. Kim, under pressure from international sanctions and a looming food shortage, has also hinted that he might return to the six-party talks, from which he unilaterally withdrew in April of this year. Mr. Lee is offering a “grand bargain” proposal, wherein the North would denuclearize all at once in exchange for a massive incentives package. China, Japan and the US have signaled support for the proposal, but many analysts consider it dead on arrival. The impending succession of Mr. Kim’s son, Kim Jong-un, is not expected to change this; his ascendency is more symbolic than substantive. It is more likely, however, that the “grand bargain” is intended to start the negotiations with the highest stakes possible, in hopes that even a scaled-back agreement would still yield some progress. Some analysts have suggested that if a summit is held, even if it is fruitless, Mr. Lee will enjoy the perception that his talks-for-denuclearization approach is working; at the very least, he will enjoy domestic support for making the effort. Mr. Lee does, however, risk looking weak should Mr. Kim commandeer the summit and walk all over him.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates reiterated during his visit to Seoul that the US is committed to South Korea’s security and pledged to keep it under their “nuclear umbrella,” ostensibly in response to Mr. Kim’s missile tests. China’s stance with Mr. Kim is also crucial to any negotiations because they are North Korea’s last lifeline. Although China expressed outright disapproval of recent missile tests, Premier Wen Jiabao gave public support to Mr. Kim when he visited Pyongyang. China enjoys a strategic “gatekeeper” role with North Korea, like Russia with Iran, which it is unlikely to relinquish any time soon. Most analysts expect little from the supposed North-South summit, but it could, if Mr. Kim is particularly desperate, turn out to be a strategic opportunity for the Koreas to make tangible and long overdue progress toward cross-border economic and social cooperation, such as increased tourism and family reunifications. The mere prospect of talks has garnered public support of Koreans on both sides of the border and sparked feelings of a fraternal bond. It is quite possible, though, that Mr. Kim is just giving his usual runaround, using the proposed summit as a test to make sure the US is still paying attention.
North Korea aside, South Korea seems keen to extend its economic and geopolitical reach. Mr. Lee recently signed free trade agreements with the EU and the US and is pursuing stronger ties with China, Japan, and neighboring ASEAN members. South Korea has also shown interest in several pan-Asian regimes currently being floated, focusing on such issues as security, trade and even human rights. Mr. Lee and Japan’s Prime Minister Hatoyama have also discussed improving the relationship between their countries, which was strained by Japan’s previous occupation of South Korea. This would be a welcome relief to Koreans who were forcefully relocated to Japan during the occupation and live there still.
Domestically, however, Mr. Lee’s government is facing significant political challenges that could impair the country’s economic recovery and international leadership ambitions. The death of former President Roh Moo-hyun, a progressive, revived his supporters and bolstered their challenge to the conservative President Lee, who is already facing low approval ratings. In response, Mr. Lee undertook several reform efforts to reunify the nation and calm political tensions. He reshuffled his cabinet and set up a presidential advisory committee on social integration, which briefly boosted his approval rating, suggesting that his efforts may be resonating with the general population.
Mr. Lee, in his UN General Assembly debut, emphasized South Korea’s desire to become a world leader on climate change, urged international action on water shortages and bid to host a UN agency on water issues. Mr. Lee sees a natural leadership role for South Korea in the G-20 as well, which has the third largest economy in Asia and 15th largest in the world. As a testament to this, the G-20 will officially be institutionalized in Seoul next year. Moreover, if the G-20 surpasses the G-8 in global importance, as some analysts predict, then South Korea stands to gain significant influence through the institution. South Korea’s aspirations could potentially cause tension with China and Japan, however, as they also pursue regional leadership roles and geopolitical influence.
Friday, February 19, 2010
Post-Conflict Sri Lanka
Author: Lauren Wells
More than four months months after the defeat of the Liberation Tigers for Tamil Eelam (LTTE), International Crisis Group (ICG) called on the international community to pressure Sri Lankan President Rajapakse to remove restrictions on international aid groups, create a timetable for resettlement of internally displaced persons, and take purposeful steps toward improving the political infringement facing the ethnic Tamil minority. With approximately one half million Tamils still in displacement camps lacking adequate medical care and sanitation, ICG’s call for action is not without merit. International frustration for immediate action is understandable, but the situation remains delicate. Even with the defeat of the LTTE, the international community should consider the history of intervention in Sri Lanka and how that relates to the prospects of lasting peace. Nationalism and political divisions have caused disaster in the past and must be considered now when pressing adherence to international norms.
More than four months months after the defeat of the Liberation Tigers for Tamil Eelam (LTTE), International Crisis Group (ICG) called on the international community to pressure Sri Lankan President Rajapakse to remove restrictions on international aid groups, create a timetable for resettlement of internally displaced persons, and take purposeful steps toward improving the political infringement facing the ethnic Tamil minority. With approximately one half million Tamils still in displacement camps lacking adequate medical care and sanitation, ICG’s call for action is not without merit. International frustration for immediate action is understandable, but the situation remains delicate. Even with the defeat of the LTTE, the international community should consider the history of intervention in Sri Lanka and how that relates to the prospects of lasting peace. Nationalism and political divisions have caused disaster in the past and must be considered now when pressing adherence to international norms.
Perceived loss of sovereignty in Sri Lanka augmented human suffering when India directly intervened in ongoing hostilities. The result was an increase in the number of internally displaced persons, child soldiers, terrorist attacks and casualties. In June 1987, Sri Lankan military forces were advancing against the LTTE. India, under intense domestic pressure, offered humanitarian assistance but was refused by President Jayewardene who feared aid would help the LTTE and trigger retaliation by Sinhalese nationalists. India proceeded without President Jayewardene’s consent and air-dropped supplies in the Jaffna Peninsula. A weakened Sri Lankan government signed the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord in July 1987 which forced the Sri Lankan military to withdraw from northern and eastern districts, giving the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) responsibility for the area. India’s actions would have the unintended consequence of fueling nationalist tension by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) who viewed the incursion as an affront to Sir Lankan sovereignty. Consequently, there would be a surge of violence by the JVP in the southern region.
Nationalism’s impact on earlier stages of the Sri Lankan conflict suggest that international organizations should be cautious in the degree of pressure put on the government in order to avoid the perception of infringing on their sovereignty. President Rajapaksa won the 2005 election on a nationalistic platform by courting Sinhalese nationalists, such as the JVP. Should sovereignty appear to waiver as a result of intense pressure from beyond their borders, then the international community risks nationalist retaliation – most likely in the form of further restrictions on international aid organizations, or pushing them out all together. Unfortunately, changes in the humanitarian situation in Sri Lanka may require moving at the government’s slow pace in order to keep moving forward at all.
Sri Lanka’s military victory over the LTTE without resolving the political and social causes of the conflict further complicate the ability to address the humanitarian situation. President Rajapaksa, in talks with India, voiced support for seeking a political solution in the ethnically divided nation, but little action has been taken so far. Once again, this has the potential to affect lasting peace. When the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord was signed in 1987 it contained provisions for the devolution of power to ethnic Tamils in the north. The agreement was reached without the consultation of Tamil representatives. With the agreement lacking support among Tamils and the LTTE, the war continued. Similarly, the lack of an agreed upon political solution now means that the peace in Sri Lanka is still very fragile. If Tamils continue to be pushed out of the process, violence could again erupt. With the destruction of LTTE leadership and continuing seizure of weapon stockpiles, violence in the near term would more likely take the form of terrorist attacks, rather than strategic military operations.
The ICG acknowledges the need for political progress to be made in Sri Lanka. It is a critical factor in lasting peace that cannot be stressed enough. Without political resolution, aid will only act as a band-aid to what is a critical wound. When the 2004 tsunami killed thousands and displaced one million people in Sri Lanka, there was a wave of humanitarian aid. Initially the government and LTTE cooperated. Hopes were high for change. That cooperation fell apart when Tamils began to suspect the government was disproportionately diverting aid to ethnic Sinhalese over Tamils. By 2006, the conflict would be back in full swing.
While there are significant differences between 1987 and the current situation that will hopefully produce a better outcome, important lessons can still be learned. The ICG is correct in calling for drastic changes in the way the Sri Lankan government is treating civilians caught in the middle of war. Unfortunately, as long as nationalism slows international assistance and the Sri Lankan government fails to addresses the political situation, peace remains fragile.
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