Separate but Equal: Analyzing the Enemy in Afghanistan

This is the third article in a three part series on Afghanistan.
Author: Lauren Wells

The United States is debating how to approach what has become the “Afghanistan problem.” Eight years after the start of its engagement in Afghanistan, it would appear that many still confuse the differences between al Qaeda and the Taliban. Many Americans use the names interchangeably to describe any violence or opposition directed toward American troops in Afghanistan. There are several similarities and distinct differences. What are they and how does that affect American strategy in the region, if at all?

Both the Taliban and al Qaeda were born out of the Soviet-Afghan War of the 1980’s. Al Qaeda originated under the direction of Osama bin Laden in the late 1980’s, most likely beginning in Pakistan. The Taliban began in the early 1990’s, coming to power in 1994. Both follow a fundamentalist Sunni ideology. In the current U.S. war in Afghanistan, both organizations have targeted U.S. troops and allies in the region. Both are motivated to defeat the current Kabul government and remove any U.S. presence from Afghanistan – and Pakistan.

However, there are two stark differences. First, the objectives of the Taliban are contained within the state, al Qaeda’s has global objectives. As seen in the bombings of the World Trade Center, the U.S.S. Cole, the London Underground, Madrid, Indonesia, and the September 11th attacks, al Qaeda goal is global jihad. Secondly, the Taliban was originally, and aims to be again, a government organization. Al Qaeda is a sub-state terrorist organization.

So how does this affect American strategy in Afghanistan? As President Obama prepares to announce his plan, many have argued for the need to focus the objective, even narrow it down. One way to do that is to more clearly define the enemy. Some, like Vice President Biden, have argued that the Taliban cannot be defeated and that America’s main goal should be to focus on al Qaeda. Supporters of this plan would argue that while the ideology of the Taliban is at odds with Western beliefs, some level of a weakened Taliban participation would be acceptable. Narrowing the focus on al Qaeda would probably also mean a shorter engagement in Afghanistan with decreased likelihood of long term commitment.

Biden and others may have a Hezbollah type scenario in mind. Hezbollah, also designated a terrorist organization by the U.S., is heavily entrenched in Lebanon’s political and social institutions, yet remains a regional actor rather than an international threat. Likewise, the Taliban has generally focused on Afghan centric issues, rather than the global jihad professed by al Qaeda. The problem with the argument that the Taliban could continue to exist as a strictly regional actor has already proven disastrous. While the Taliban was in power, from 1994 to 2001, they were a regional actor that harbored an organization with international reach. Bin Laden was allowed to move, plan, and act with impunity.

The Taliban rose to power in a period of chaos in Afghanistan. With electoral uncertainty surrounding the re-election of Hamid Karzai and factional fighting, allowing the Taliban to continue would be no guarantee that they would not regain popularity and strength in the near future, again allowing al Qaeda or similar terrorist organization to rebound as well. Unfortunately, supporters of this strategy may sacrifice a long term commitment now, for a potentially cyclical commitment in Afghanistan and the Global War on Terror over the coming years.

Others, such as General McChrystal, believe al Qaeda and the Taliban cannot be so easily separated; that ignoring the Taliban portion of the equation would result in failure. As long as popular support exists for the Taliban and the Afghan people perceive a lack of a viable alternative, there exists the chance that the Taliban will only regain power once U.S. and NATO forces withdrawal. This is probably a more accurate picture of the interactions between al Qaeda and the Taliban. It would be too simple and too narrow to believe that American strategy in Afghanistan can easily separate the Taliban from al Qaeda. It is much more complex than that.

This strategy would mean a longer commitment now in order to insure a stable, transparent government. As the recent presidential elections in Afghanistan demonstrated, this will not be an easy task quickly achieved. Unfortunately, the American public is tired of the war and support has declined significantly. Clearly defining who the antagonists are in Afghanistan, the rationale behind their deserved attention, and what must be done to succeed will go a long way in regaining the public’s support.