Post-Conflict Sri Lanka

Author: Lauren Wells

More than four months months after the defeat of the Liberation Tigers for Tamil Eelam (LTTE), International Crisis Group (ICG) called on the international community to pressure Sri Lankan President Rajapakse to remove restrictions on international aid groups, create a timetable for resettlement of internally displaced persons, and take purposeful steps toward improving the political infringement facing the ethnic Tamil minority. With approximately one half million Tamils still in displacement camps lacking adequate medical care and sanitation, ICG’s call for action is not without merit. International frustration for immediate action is understandable, but the situation remains delicate. Even with the defeat of the LTTE, the international community should consider the history of intervention in Sri Lanka and how that relates to the prospects of lasting peace. Nationalism and political divisions have caused disaster in the past and must be considered now when pressing adherence to international norms.

Perceived loss of sovereignty in Sri Lanka augmented human suffering when India directly intervened in ongoing hostilities. The result was an increase in the number of internally displaced persons, child soldiers, terrorist attacks and casualties. In June 1987, Sri Lankan military forces were advancing against the LTTE. India, under intense domestic pressure, offered humanitarian assistance but was refused by President Jayewardene who feared aid would help the LTTE and trigger retaliation by Sinhalese nationalists. India proceeded without President Jayewardene’s consent and air-dropped supplies in the Jaffna Peninsula. A weakened Sri Lankan government signed the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord in July 1987 which forced the Sri Lankan military to withdraw from northern and eastern districts, giving the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) responsibility for the area. India’s actions would have the unintended consequence of fueling nationalist tension by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) who viewed the incursion as an affront to Sir Lankan sovereignty. Consequently, there would be a surge of violence by the JVP in the southern region.

Nationalism’s impact on earlier stages of the Sri Lankan conflict suggest that international organizations should be cautious in the degree of pressure put on the government in order to avoid the perception of infringing on their sovereignty. President Rajapaksa won the 2005 election on a nationalistic platform by courting Sinhalese nationalists, such as the JVP. Should sovereignty appear to waiver as a result of intense pressure from beyond their borders, then the international community risks nationalist retaliation – most likely in the form of further restrictions on international aid organizations, or pushing them out all together. Unfortunately, changes in the humanitarian situation in Sri Lanka may require moving at the government’s slow pace in order to keep moving forward at all.

Sri Lanka’s military victory over the LTTE without resolving the political and social causes of the conflict further complicate the ability to address the humanitarian situation. President Rajapaksa, in talks with India, voiced support for seeking a political solution in the ethnically divided nation, but little action has been taken so far. Once again, this has the potential to affect lasting peace. When the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord was signed in 1987 it contained provisions for the devolution of power to ethnic Tamils in the north. The agreement was reached without the consultation of Tamil representatives. With the agreement lacking support among Tamils and the LTTE, the war continued. Similarly, the lack of an agreed upon political solution now means that the peace in Sri Lanka is still very fragile. If Tamils continue to be pushed out of the process, violence could again erupt. With the destruction of LTTE leadership and continuing seizure of weapon stockpiles, violence in the near term would more likely take the form of terrorist attacks, rather than strategic military operations.

The ICG acknowledges the need for political progress to be made in Sri Lanka. It is a critical factor in lasting peace that cannot be stressed enough. Without political resolution, aid will only act as a band-aid to what is a critical wound. When the 2004 tsunami killed thousands and displaced one million people in Sri Lanka, there was a wave of humanitarian aid. Initially the government and LTTE cooperated. Hopes were high for change. That cooperation fell apart when Tamils began to suspect the government was disproportionately diverting aid to ethnic Sinhalese over Tamils. By 2006, the conflict would be back in full swing.

While there are significant differences between 1987 and the current situation that will hopefully produce a better outcome, important lessons can still be learned. The ICG is correct in calling for drastic changes in the way the Sri Lankan government is treating civilians caught in the middle of war. Unfortunately, as long as nationalism slows international assistance and the Sri Lankan government fails to addresses the political situation, peace remains fragile.