I recently participated in the 62nd Annual United Nations Department of Public Information/Non-Governmental Organizations Conference on disarmament in Mexico City. I spoke on a panel that grappled with the question of how technology such as missile defense systems could help create trust in order to facilitate the conditions for nuclear disarmament.
On April 5, 2009, President Barack Obama spoke before a crowd in Hradcany Square in Prague. He said,
“I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. I’m not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly—perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence. But now we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change.”During the panel, many in the audience were skeptical, and rightly so. But rather than succumbing to the paralysis of accepting the shortcomings of the current international system, we chose to begin with a state of nuclear disarmament in order to find the conditions under which such an outcome might occur.
To maintain a stable equilibrium in this scenario, we made two main assumptions. First, non-nuclear states would lack incentives to develop the technology to produce nuclear weapons. Otherwise, nuclear-capable states would seek to escape a disarmament regime. Second, we assumed that any non-nuclear states that developed and used nuclear weapons would be uniformly punished. Non-nuclear states must not gain from defecting from a disarmament regime.
Running with these two assumptions, we used various international relations theories as lenses in order to derive what conditions would be necessary to maintain a stable equilibrium in a disarmament regime. For example, proponents of Constructivism believe that the reality that motivates state action is socially constructed by interactions between states and related actors. This lens implies that there must be mutual agreement upon the goal of nuclear disarmament. Such uniform agreement would require high levels of trust between the current nuclear capable powers, trust in the effectiveness of the missile defense system, and trust in the verification regime. Currently, there is little agreement upon the goal. This begs the question: what is the principle that underpins the current nuclear regime? While some argue that there is a norm against the use of nuclear weapons, the continuation of nuclear proliferation suggests that the need for a robust deterrence still exists.
Realists, on the other hand, believe that the international relations system is composed of states seeking security in a zero-sum anarchical world where material capabilities determine actions. This lens suggests that in order to maintain equilibrium, there must be no gain to developing nuclear weapons. Therefore, in the absence of a robust and universal agreement on the goal of a nuclear disarmament regime, equilibrium would require a robust and automatic enforcement mechanism. The enforcement mechanism would punish those who either defected from or refused to participate in the disarmament regime. It would require a reliable and trusted verification system and an automaticity of punishment. But punishment is problematic. What kind of cost could the international system impose upon an attack thwarted by effective ballistic missile defense? Too weak of a response would threaten the effectiveness of the deterrence. Too strong, and the international community would have to develop the capacity and consensus for regime change.
The third and equally challenging requirement comes from neoliberalism. Neoliberalism focuses upon the role of institutions and how organizations can help to reduce the potential costs of state interaction where each may benefit from absolute gains. Neoliberalism might call for an institution different from any that currently exist. Such an institution must be built from a foundation of greater trust, common agreement upon the need for nuclear disarmament, and possess a robust enforcement mechanism. Currently, no one organization possesses sufficient capacity, legitimacy, and power. Moreover, the details of how this organization might operate are challenging. How much sovereignty would have to be relinquished? Would it be created from the top down or bottom up? How would it be formed? Who would control it? Where would it obtain funding? One might look to the history of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as a telling example of the kind of challenges a disarmament regime might face.
Finally, taking a cue from realists who focus upon material capabilities, and from Dean Wilkening, a noted expert in the field of missile defense, one way to structure a ballistic missile defense system is at the least common denominator of protection. The system would be sufficient, for example, to protect against an accidental launch from Russia or China, or an intentional launch from a rogue regime, but not so robust as to threaten the retaliatory capabilities of any nuclear capable power with less robust missile capabilities, such as China. In short, using international relations theories as lenses to derive some of the necessary components of a stable disarmament regime, we determined that it would require: a new organization, underpinned by significant trust between nations; common agreement upon the goal of disarmament; a robust verification and enforcement mechanism; and a missile defense system that provides a lowest common denominator of protection.
But even if the disarmament regime worked exactly as intended, it presents a number of challenges that should be addressed. The first problem with an effective missile defense system is that it pushes regimes and rogue actors to pursue unconventional attacks such as suitcase nukes and dirty bombs. Since such weapons require less funding and infrastructure, they are harder to trace. From a cost-benefit perspective, it then becomes harder to justify spending large sums of money upon costly missile defense systems given the likelihood of their use. In addition, these disarmament regimes, as well as many policymakers in nuclear-capable countries, possess a narrow view of rationality. One must consider the possibility that a leader might be willing to risk his people, military, or hold on power in the hopes that enforcement will fail or due to a set of priorities different from the norm.
These challenges suggest that for some states, deterrence will be insufficient to prevent attacks upon nuclear-capable powers. Thus, other methods will have to be added to the disarmament regime in order to make it more fully effective. Overall, this is only a thumbnail sketch of what might be necessary to create an effective and long-term nuclear disarmament regime and the challenges involved in getting there.
The Obama administration seems to be making a good faith attempt to move toward this goal. The first was seen in the shift in policy on the planned European missile defense system. While there are many theories as to the actual reasoning for the change, it is a costly signal for the administration. Another costly signal will be the upcoming fight in the Senate to ratify the CTBTO treaty. In addition, for the U.S. to continue to press for a shared missile defense system with Russia suggests a willingness to trust a former Cold War enemy by the sharing the risk of national defense. The two have been taking steps towards lowering their arms levels for many years, but have not approached a level that would threaten their capacity for deterrence. Thus, while the present situation is worthy of hope, the future is still far, far away.
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