Comparing Taliban and Al-Shabaab

This is the second article in a three part series on Afghanistan.

Author: Amanda Towler

Comparing the Taliban in Afghanistan and Al-Shabaab Militia in Somalia

There are striking similarities between the rise of the Al-Shabaab militia in Somalia since 2006, and the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan between 1994 and 2001. Most significantly, both hard-line Islamist groups about in an atmosphere of chaos, nonexistent central government, tribal and factional fighting, general poverty and disarray. Both groups sought to fill a power void with their extremist interpretations of Islamic shari’a law and combat the feable and corrupt Western-supported governments. This article will compare how the Taliban and Al-Shabaab interpret and enforce Islamic law, in hopes of providing some insight into whether the recent history of the Taliban holds any lessons for understanding Al-Shabaab. Will Islamic extreamism eventually erode the support of Al-Shabaab in Somalia as it did the Taliban toward the end of its rule in Afghanistan? How might this affect the Somali government’s counterstrategy decisions?

The table below provides a brief look at the similarities between the Taliban’s and Al-Shabaab’s enforcement of shari’a law in the territories they control(led).

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One common thread between the rule of the two groups is the strict and swift punishments given out to petty thieves and adulters, ranging from instant beatings to public amputations and executions. This may be one reason why each group initially enjoyed considerable popularity, as people may have welcomed swift justice as an alternative to no justice at all. Another commonality is the banning of sources of Western influence, including television and cinema by the Taliban, and pop-song cell phone ringers by Al-Shabaab. This likely resonated with the more conservative religious people who already resented Western influence in their society in their government. Still another similarity, not reflected in the table, is how both groups have colluded with Al Qaeda to varying degrees and on pragmatic terms. Al-Shabaab has declared its allegiance to Al Qaeda, but there is little evidence that Al Qaeda provides tactical or strategic leadership to the group. Perhaps the most significant difference between the two groups, however, is the Taliban’s far more extreme restrictions on women; thus far Al-Shabaab has not enacted the same level of oppression as did the Taliban. This may be because Al-Shabaab is currently devoting most of its capacity to active combat and it does not have the time or manpower to enforce such broad changes in behavior. It may also reflect pragmatism on the part of Al-Shabaab—they may be muffling their extreme message in response to some protests and loss of popular support. Some Somali women have voiced their concern about what life would be like under Al-Shabaab control, while others feel that Al-Shabaab’s enforcement of shari’a has been good for society. Al-Shabaab’s actions suggest that it would severely restrict many aspects of women’s lives if it won control over the country.

Comparing the Taliban and Al-Shabaab allows us to compare the effectiveness of counterstrategies that the respective central governments and their allies have used to combat these militant groups. In Afghanistan, a primary counterstrategy was to exploit the rifts in the Taliban and to target members whose commitment to the Taliban was wavering. Al-Shabaab also suffers from internal rifts, suggesting that a similar strategy, which the Somali transitional government is now employing, may eventually prove effective. The current U.S. and NATO strategy in Afghanistan places heavy emphasis on rooting out endemic corruption in local and national government and equipping it with the means to provide basic services and infrastructure. In Somalia, similar measures could go a long way toward winning back the support of many moderate Somalis who are not intellectually aligned with Al-Shabaab but appreciate the marginal stability and security the group provides. This is perhaps the most important lesson that the experience of Afghanistan can offer to Somalia, that the ideologically extreme militant group only enjoys support as a last resort, when the secular state has failed to offer a better alternative.